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SEIZING PRIVATE PAPERS: GREATER
PROTECTIONS FOR A DIGITAL AGE
Stanley A. Goldman*
Before I comment on an area of Professor Shiffrin's scholarship,
I want to mention just a few things I found most memorable about
having been one of his law school classmates. First, it was all but
impossible for anyone else to get the highest grade in any class you
took with him. I do not believe that I ever did as well in any course
in my life as I did in Evidence. It was taught by a wonderful visiting
professor from the University of California at Davis named Jim
Hogan. I remember devouring the subject like a young Hasid
discovering the Ba'al Shem Toy. When I learned our final exam was
a multiple choice test, I realized I had a chance of doing something
I'd never done; I had a chance of getting all the answers right on a
test. I spent nights studying for the exam. Sure enough, when the
grades were posted I had done it. I had gotten 100 percent right, and
Steven got the Am Jur. Somehow, even my 100 was not as good as
his 100.
The single most memorable thing about Steven, however, was
oddly enough not his academic prowess, but rather his mode of
transportation. I remember the first time I got into Steven's auto. I
turned and said to him, "This is the worst car I have ever been in." It
was a convertible, but I was not entirely convinced it had begun life
that way. There were no floor mats, there were no carpets on the
floors, your feet rested on metal. You had to sit carefully to avoid
the springs coming out of the tom seats. "You're a night student;
your day job is as a tenured professor at a state college; you can't tell
me you couldn't afford something just a little better than this," I
chided him. I have never forgotten his response: "I could get a more
expensive vehicle, but why would I want to? This is the best
possible car I could own because everything that can go wrong with
* Professor of Law, Director, Center for the Study of Law and Genocide, Loyola Law
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this car has already gone wrong. How much worse could it ever get?
I can feel confident that when I take it out for a drive around town,
there will be no unpleasant surprises." Although at the time it
reminded me of something out of Candide,' it turned out to be a
philosophy so fungible to many of life's pursuits that I may even find
it necessary to return to it before I will be able to complete my
comments.
I think that is probably enough about my remembrances of
things past and my bitterness over lost Am Jur awards. I will spend
the remainder of this comment on a bit of Steven's lesser known
Fourth Amendment scholarship; I'd like to discuss a Steven Shiffrin
student article, published when he was a staff member on the Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review, titled: The Search and Seizure of Private
2 In this work
Papers:Fourth and Fifth Amendment Considerations.
the younger Steven argued that the search and seizure of private
papers is in fact prohibited by a right of privacy to be found in the
combination of the Fourth Amendment's particularity and probable
cause requirements and in a Fifth Amendment privacy right?
In 1886 the United States Supreme Court had declared, in the
great case of Boyd v. United States,4 that private papers could not be
seized by the Government, not only because doing so would
constitute an unreasonable search and seizure under the Court's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, but also because it would
require the author of the papers to be a witness against himself in
violation of the Fifth Amendment prohibition. "[W]e have been
unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and
papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different
from compelling him to be a witness against himself," wrote the
Boyd majority.5
Thirty-five years later, in Gouled v. United States,6 the Supreme
Court expanded this prohibition on the seizing of evidence to include
not only the subjects' private papers, but also any property seized for
1. VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE (John Butt trans., Penguin Books 1947) (1759).
2. Steven H. Shiffrin, Note, The Search and Seizure of Private Papers: Fourth and Fifth
Amendment Considerations,6 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 274 (1973).
3. Id. at 309-10.
4. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
5. Id. at 633.
6. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).

Fall 20071

PROTECTIONS FOR A DIGITAL AGE

mere evidentiary purposes. This became known as the "mere
evidence rule," a "rule" which allowed searches or warrants for
searches to be issued only when the subject matter sought to be
seized fell into the categories of contraband, fruits of the crimes
being investigated, or instrumentalities of those crimes. The Gouled
majority felt that the Boyd case had attempted to articulate as its
central principle the idea that privacy interests outweigh any claimed
law enforcement need for, not only the seizing of private papers, but
any property sought solely for the purpose of using it as evidence
against the subject of the search.7 Both Boyd and Gouled therefore
created "a zone of privacy which the government could not breach to
discover items of mere evidentiary value."8
In 1967, however, the United States Supreme Court, in Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden,9 began its dismantling of these
Justice Brennan, speaking for the
broad privacy guarantees.
majority, overturned the "mere evidence rule."'" From this point
forward, warrants could be issued and warrantless searches
conducted for even "mere evidence" of the commission of a crime.
This greatly expanded the opportunities for government intrusion
into individual privacy by broadening the scope of searchable items.
In spite of this, Justice Brennan's assertion that the "principal object
of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy"" is consistent
with Professor Shiffrin's theory that the search and seizure of private
papers be regulated by privacy considerations rather than by selfincrimination concepts. 2
Unfortunately, Steven's article appeared in the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review three years before the case of Andresen v.
Maryland.3 There, the Supreme Court, consistent with Steven's
thesis, clearly concluded that since a search compels neither an act of
creation nor production, no Fifth Amendment rights are implicated."
Contrary to Steven's theory, however, the Court repudiated the idea
7. Id. at 309-10.

8. Shiffrin, supra note 2, at 280.
9. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).

10. Id. at310.
11. Id. at 304.
12. Shiffrin, supra note 2, at 309-10.
13. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).

14. Id. at 477.
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that Fourth Amendment privacy interests protected private papers to
any greater degree than it did any other form of seizable evidence. 5
In the generation since Andresen, a digital revolution has
provided even greater potential governmental access, with or without
warrants, to our writings and ideas. Perhaps it is time to resurrect at
least a modest reconsideration of whether the seizing of private
documents, electronic communications, and recordings should be
given greater protection than provided by Andresen.
As part of his 1973 proposal, Steven argued for a sliding scale of
protection, depending on the nature of the writings sought by the
Government. 6 He saw no great privacy interests violated, for
example, in the seizure of gambling records. On the other hand, with
respect to items such as diaries, he concluded that not only does their
seizure give rise to significant privacy concerns, but they typically
need not be seized in order to effectuate the general enforcement of
any particular law. Their seizure, in whole or in part, should not
Even here, however, Steven was
normally be countenanced.
prepared to accept such searches and seizures if the content sought to
be seized could be described in the affidavit to the warrant with such
particularity that it is clear that privacy interests would not be
compromised.
In some respects, this latter suggestion foreshadows the
constitutional requirements under the Fifth Amendment with respect
to the subpoenaing of documents. In Fisher v. United States 7 and
United States v. Doe, 8 the Supreme Court informed us that while the
Fourth Amendment protects privacy, the Fifth Amendment does not.
Since, as the Court had held with respect to seizing documents, a
subpoena does not compel creation of the writing, no privilegeagainst-self-incrimination claim can be asserted with respect to its
contents. However, the subpoena will not be valid unless the
government knows as a foregone conclusion that such documents
exist and are in the possession of the subject of the subpoena."
15. Id. at 480.
16. Shiffrin, supra note 2, at 309-11.
17. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
18. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
19. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 45 (2000) (holding that a subpoena for the
production of documents violated the Fifth Amendment because the government had failed to
establish that it had had "any prior knowledge of either the existence or the whereabouts" of the
requested records).
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Though founded upon a Fifth Amendment concern that the actual
turning over of documents for which there is no foregone conclusion
would be forcing the targets of the subpoena to incriminate
themselves by admitting the existence and/or possession of the
sought documents, there is no reason why the same restriction could
not be seen as a legitimate prophylactic against the invasion of
Fourth Amendment privacy interests.
I would argue that it is time Professor Shiffrin returned to the
question of the search and seizure of private papers because we need
him. We need eminent scholars of his stature to return to this
moribund area that the Supreme Court has so long ignored.
Of course, the question could be legitimately posed as to why
anyone would voluntarily write in an area in which it would seem
they are so unlikely to stimulate real change, certainly for years to
come. The answer to this question goes to the very essence of the
philosophy of life that Steven so earnestly related to me all those
years ago in his dilapidated automobile: This is the best possible
cause to espouse because everything that can go wrong with it has
already gone wrong. How much worse could it possibly get? He can
feel assured that when he takes this theory out for a drive around
town, there will be no unpleasant surprises.
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